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Abstract: Blocking of foreign Web content by Internet access providers has been
a hot topic for the last 18 months in Germany. Since fall 2001 the state of North-
Rhine-Westphalia very actively tried to mandate such blocking. This paper will take a
technical view on the problems imposed by the blocking orders and blocking content
at access or network provider level in general. It will also give some empirical data on
the effects of the blocking orders to help in the legal assessment of the orders.
1 The Problem
The blocking order was decreed by the district government of Du¨sseldorf and is trying to
force access providers to block US-hosted Web pages, it stirred considerable discussion
in the German legal and civil rights communities. The orders raise considerable legal and
policy issues which are being discussed broadly in literature and in front of several courts.
Being a “technopolicy” issue, the blocking orders involve a complex interplay between
engineering, applied psychology, law and economics. While the legal issues have been
discussed in considerable detail by scholars, administration, civil right groups, lawyers
and courts there has been no serious discussion about other aspects of the issues involved
in the blocking order.
This paper will try to shed some light on the engineering issues involved. Network en-
gineering issues of the blocking orders have seen no serious analysis up to now. Legal
literature mainly refers to other legal literature for these issues, which has resulted in soma
lack of technical depth in the discussion.
Little is known about the workings and side-effects of the different techniques discussed
for blocking. While IP-filtering is at least well studied in the context of network security
and considerable commercial experience exists with filtering HTTP proxy software, us-
ing recursive DNS servers to fake data in zones delegated to other entities is an obscure
technique which hasn’t seen any serious research so far.
To analyze the network engineering issues of the blocking orders it will be first looked into
different techniques which could be used to deploy blocking at provider level, including
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their actual workings, pitfalls and circumvention measures. Then we will try to find what
the blocking order actually asks for. Finally we will survey if and how providers comply
with the order.
2 Techniques of blocking
To take a look at techniques which can be used for blocking it must first be determined
what is meant by “blocking”. Blocking should be defined in scope of this work as refusing
users access to certain web pages without the cooperation of the content provider, the
hosting provider and the the owner of the client machine being used to access these pages.
This will set a focus on measures implemented at the access provider or backbone provider
level. Both kinds of companies will be summarized as providers in the rest of this paper.
Filtering measures at the providers can be categorized in three groups working at two
different OSI-Model layers: IP-filtering attacks at the networking layer to deny traffic
with the blocked hosts. DNS-tampering doesn’t block the inter-host communication itself,
but keeps the client from finding the information needed to initiate communication with
the blocked host name. Filtering Proxies are interposed in the communication and a wide
array of modifications to traffic passing them including the denial of access to blocked
content completely can be accomplished with this technique.
It will be now looked into the technical details of each of these ways of blocking including
their implementation, cost, granularity, side effects and circumvention.
2.1 Packet Filtering
Packet filtering describes a technique used by routers and other devices embedded in the
data stream deciding whether to allow or deny further passage to single packets by looking
at the headers of the packets while they pass through them. Two types of packet filter-
ing relevant to blocking of Web hosts can be distinguished: layer 3 filtering and layer 4
filtering. While generally based on the same principles the two methods differ in their
granularity and resource consumption on the filtering device.
Packet filtering functionality is generally already available in routers deployed between
provider’s networks to provide mechanisms for security precautions like egress and ingress
filtering. This means that providers in principle do not need to buy new hardware to deploy
packet filtering based blocking.
Packet filtering offers no way of informing users trying to access blocked content of the
blocking measures and, even more important, there is no way of informing users trying to
access services which were not intended to be blocked but actually are blocked because of
coarse granularity in IP-filtering.
2.1.1 Layer 3 Filtering
Layer 3 filtering looks at the so called IP-header which mainly contains information about
the machine sending the packet and the machine where the packet is designated. Both are
encoded as so called IP-addresses. Layer 3 filters basically allows to define filtering rules
which match on destination address or source address of the communication.
To block the access to Web content on a certain host, all traffic outbound to the host’s
address or inbound coming from the host’s address can be denied. Both variants result
in total suppression of all successful Web communication with the host. The reason is
that already the the TCP handshake which initializes the Web HTTP connection can’t be
successfully completed. When only incoming traffic from the blocked host is denied, the
blocked host could use special software to monitor the arriving SYN-packets as the first
step in a TCP-handshake. This would give the ability to count the number of requests tried
but suppressed by the blocking measure. To the user trying to access the blocked Web
content, IP-filtering only in incoming direction would result in an extended wait when
trying to access the blocked host followed by an error message like “Connection timed
out”. When traffic going out to the blocked host is denied, the owner of the blocked host
has no ability to monitor connection attempts. To the user accessing the host, this would
depending on the actual implementation of the filter rule mean immediately a “Couldn’t
connect” or a “Connection timed out” error message.
Layer 3 filtering denies practically all communication between the blocked host and the
blocking providers network. This means that not only accessing Web pages is suppressed,
but also all other services provided by the host, be it email, chat, Usenet or anything else.
It also means that the blocked host can’t request Web pages from the blocking providers
network or initiate other forms of Internet based direct communication with the blocking
providers network.
Layer 3 filtering uses relatively little resources on the networking devices preforming it.
Routers generally have to parse addresses in the IP-header to decide further routing of
packets. Nevertheless, routers can only process a fixed amount of rules effectively. Also
routers in the cashed-stripped telecommunications business might already be used at their
maximum capacity and can’t handle any additional resource overhead at all.
2.1.2 Layer 4 Filtering
Layer 4 filtering uses all the information available to layer 3 filtering but also inspects the
headers of the data inside the IP packets. The main information gained by this inspection
are the so called port numbers.
Port numbers allow Internet hosts to offer several services using the same IP-address.
Every well known Internet service has a port number assigned which is used to direct
incoming data to the appropriate server software on the host. Often used ports include
21 for file transfer (FTP), 25 for sending email (SMTP), 53 for DNS, 80 for the Web
(HTTP) and 110 for reading email (POP3). Web access is insofar special, because besides
the standard port 80 some other ports are also used regularly for Web purposes. Port 443
is used for secure Web connections (HTTPS) and people sometimes run their Web server
software on ports 8000 and 8080, which seems to be done mostly for Unix implementation
specific reasons.
By basing the filtering decision not only on the destination IP-address but also on the
destination port number, it is possible to do blocking on a per service basis. This means
while blocking all direct Web access of content on the blocked host, users still would
be able to use other services on it, like email and chat. Blocking on layer 4 will also
practically not affect attempts from the blocked host to access services in the blocking
provider’s network.
User experience of layer 4 filtering when accessing blocked contents is generally compa-
rable with the effects of layer 3 filtering described above.
Network devices do not have to parse layer 4 headers for their routing decision. This
results in a theoretical increase of processing needed when activating layer 4 filtering.
While layer 4 filtering can be used to focus blocking only on Web Access by just denying
traffic to port 80 and possibly 443, 8000 and 8080, it still works on an all-or-nothing basis
with regard to which Web pages will be blocked. There is no control at all on the degree to
which content on the host using the blocked IP will be suppressed. Accessing the volume
of content unintentionally blocked together with the content blocked intentionally is a
difficult problem.
An obvious problem is content by the same content provider presented in the same pub-
lishing context. We will call this a ”Website”. Usually only certain pages of a site will
give reason for blocking, but IP-filtering will block all content on that Website. In the last
century it was very likely that a Web host contained a large number of sites in different
subdirectories. While using a different domain name but the same IP-address for every
Website at a hosting provider has become widespread nowadays, we still see Web hosts
serving dozens and sometimes thousands of Websites using the same domain name. A
prime example are Universities’ Web servers, where each faculty usually runs its own Web
server on which each institute presents its information in a subdirectory upon its own re-
sponsibility as an independent Website. An other famous example is www.xs4all.nl which
hosted between 3000 [Pro97] and 6000 [Sie99] different Websites when it was blocked in
1996/1997 by German providers because of about twp dozen illegal pages.
Another technique for hosting several sites on a single host is so called “name based vir-
tual hosting” which is mandatory supported by the actual standard for Web access named
HTTP/1.1 [FGM+99], but was also widely supported in HTTP/1.0 compliant software
[APN00]. With name based virtual hosting, a host can provide content for several differ-
ent Web sites using different domain names but sharing a single IP-address.
This means that blocking a single IP-address can deny access to several domain names
at once. This problem gets worse by the fact that there is without the cooperation of
the hosting provider no reliable way of determining how many domain names and which
domain names are hosted at a certain IP-address. A recent study by Benjamin Edelman
found that more than 87% of all domains deploy name based virtual hosting for their
primary Web server [Ede03]. Edelman surveyed only the Top-Level Domains com, net
and org and only searched for the most common host name www. This indicates that the
actual number of sites sharing IP-addresses is even higher. In [Ros03b] it is reported that
www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.org is served by virtual hosting. My own research shows that at
least parts of the stormfront.org domain deploy virtual hosting.
2.2 DNS-Tampering
Tampering with the Domain Name System (DNS), a worldwide distributed database now
seems to be the preferred way of blocking - at least the district government and the courts
focus on this in their legal arguments. The whole area of DNS is plagued by inconsistent
use of terminology. So we first look into the terminology and workings of DNS, then at
the ways of deploying blocking and the problems in doing so.
In Internet based communication, computers are addressed by their IP-address which is
uniquely identifying a host taking part in Internet communication. The IP-address is a
number roughly in the range between 0 and 4 billion, usually written as four numbers sep-
arated by dots, e.g. 172.19.234.11. Since these numbers seemed inappropriate for human
use the DNS was introduced as a distributed telephone book like service mapping names
to addresses. DNS database lookups are nowadays so tightly integrated into applications
and operating systems that users can be completely ignorant of IP-addresses and use only
domain names. Even programming languages and APIs like the Python socket module
start hiding the existence of IP-addresses from programmers.
Still every use of Internet communication using a domain name first results in a DNS
lookup and after that in the requested connection itself to the resulting IP-address as shown
in Figure 1. DNS-tampering does not address the denial of transport to the actual data from
the blocked host to the user requesting the content.
DNS-tampering on todays Internet can’t distinguish between different services although
wider deployment of so called DNS SRV resource records might change that. The actual
situation means that many effects of DNS-tampering are similar to layer 3 IP-filtering: All
services of the blocked domain name, be it Web, chat or file transfer, will be inaccessible.
The only exception is email which will be routed not only via the so called DNS A resource
records used for other services, but also via DNS MX resource records used exclusively
for email.
2.2.1 Terminology
First of all: up to now nobody has advocated the blocking or filtering of DNS traffic. All
proposals center around answering DNS queries directed to the providers recursive DNS
servers with replies not representing the actual data saved in the distributed DNS database.
This might be viewed as corruption of requests to the distributed DNS database or as faking
DNS replies. Thus the term “DNS-tampering” is more appropriate than “DNS-blocking”.
An other source of confusion is the usage of the term “DNS server”. This term is often
used for software preforming two completely different functions. The fact that the popular
BIND software package integrates this two functions in a single piece of software and
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Figure 1: Working of recursive DNS servers
thus both functions are sometimes preformed by the same host further fosters confusion.
Even best-of-breed technical literature on DNS like [AL99] uses imprecise language on
this matter.
To reduce confusion, naming convention based on [Moc87] Section 2.2, the standard defin-
ing DNS, should be used:
Name Server The Purpose of name servers is the publishing of DNS data. They are part
of the distributed DNS database and usually maintained by hosting providers or their
associates. Persons not involved in the management of networks usually never get
in direct contact with name servers.
Recursive Server Recursive Servers, also known as “recursive resolvers” query name
servers on behalf of their clients. The conversion of an name to an IP-address is
usually done by querying name servers in a recursive fashion. This means that the
first name server queried (the so called “root name server”) returns a reference to
another name server which can provide further detail and will provide reference
again until ultimately a name server is found which can provide the actual data
being searched for. The piece of software carrying out the query process is called
a “resolver”. It can be seen as a database query tool querying the distributed DNS
database. In instances where a client machine does not implement a resolver on
its own, it contains a “stub resolver” which sends queries just to a recursive server
which will carry out the query process on the clients behalf and return the final result
to the client. See figure 1 for an overview.
Technically speaking recursive servers can be seen as DNS proxy servers. An end
user may come in contact with recursive servers when configuring his Internet ac-
cess. Recursive servers are often called “DNS-Servers” in general literature or in
Operating System configuration dialogs. To accommodate this recursive servers
will be called “recursive DNS servers” in the rest of this paper.
Further confusion arises from the fuzzy terminology relating to domain names. The terms
“host name”, “host”, “domain name”, “domain” and “site” are often used as if they were
interchangeable. Following definitions are based on [Moc87] and [AL99].
Domain Name A fully qualified domain name (FQDN) is a dotted string unambiguously
pointing to an object in the global DNS database. For brevity it will be assumed in
this paper that all domain names are FQDNs.
Domain A domain is a subtree in the distributed DNS database. It can be identified by a
domain name. All domain names ending in this domain name are part of the domain.
Zone A zone is a possibly pruned subtree in the distributed DNS database. Zones contain
at least one domain and might or might not contain subdomains branching off that
domain. For many name server and recursive DNS server software a zone is the
smallest unit to which access controls, authority and the like can be applied.
DNS Resource Record A domain name usually points to a handful different types of
data in the distributed DNS database. The individual records of data are called DNS
resource records.
DNS A Resource Record DNS A resource records pointing to a host’s IP-address allow-
ing the fundamental application of the DNS by mapping names to addresses.
DNS MX Resource Record DNS MX resource records are used for deciding which host
will receive the email for a domain name. DNS MX resource records point to a
domain name while DNS A resource records point to an IP-address.
Host A host is a machine accessible from the Internet via at least one IP-address. It
usually also has at least one domain name pointing to it’s IP-address.
Interaction between email delivery and DNS-tampering can be extremely complex. Email
delivery usually involves at least two computers running so called Mail Transport Agent
(MTA) Software. The first MTA often runs on a different host than the one the user is uti-
lizing to compose and send the email. The host running the first MTA may use a different
recursive DNS server which might be tampered with differently than the one the user is
utilizing. Also most MTAs under certain conditions try to use DNS A resource records
instead of DNS MX resource records. To keep discussion of the effects of DNS-tampering
to email to a tolerable level, in this paper only a simple case will be considered where the
first MTA uses the same recursive server as the user and only deploys DNS MX resource
record lookups to find the destination server.
2.2.2 Blocking Techniques using DNS
The DNS Protocol as defined by [Moc87] reserves a response code named REFUSED
to indicate that “the name server refuses to perform the specified operation for policy
reasons.” While [Moc87] speaks of name servers, there is no indication that this response
code shouldn’t be used by recursive DNS servers.
Returning the REFUSED response code to DNS requests for the domain names of sites
to be blocked is the obvious way of blocking via DNS. Users trying to access the site
would see an error message along the lines of “Host not found”. Configuration for doing
so with the popular BIND software package is shown in figure 2. Note that you can’t use
this configuration technique with BIND to only refuse queries to DNS A resource records.
Instead queries all other resource records in the zone. including DNS MX resource records,
are refused.
//REFUSED configuration
zone "REFUSED.example.com" {
type master; file "dummy.zone";
allow-query {none;};
};
// silence configuration
zone "silence.example.com" {
// no name server listening on 127.0.0.1
type forward; forwarders {127.0.0.1;};
forward only; };
// SERVERFAIL configuration
zone "SERVERFAIL.example.com" {
// no name server listening on 127.0.0.1
type slave; masters {127.0.0.1;};
file "/tmp/dummy.zone"; };
Figure 2: Configuration Examples for BIND.
Other manipulations at the providers recursive server are possible and - as will be shown
by empirical results - common. There are five classes of forgery which can be used to
suppress communication:
NXDOMAIN This form of forgery returns a “Name Error”, commonly called NXDO-
MAIN, meaning that the name which the user is asking for does not exist. Per
[Moc87] this answer may only be sent by “authoritative name server” for the re-
quested domain which the provider’s recursive DNS server is not, so this is forgery
of DNS data and a breach of the DNS standard. This manipulation will result in
a “Host not found” error message to the user. Using BIND this behaviour is con-
figured by creating an empty zone file and reconfiguring BIND not to run just as
an recursive DNS server, but also as an authorative name server for a zone with the
same name as the the domain name to block. This technique can be used in principle
to manipulate single DNS resource records. Name hijacking
Name Hijacking Name hijacking means that recursive DNS servers do not return the data
saved in the distributed DNS database but some made up data aimed at directing the
client at another host than the one it was looking for. As with NXDOMAIN replies
this forgery is not standard compliant. Usually the user will see a different Web
page than the one he intended to access. This is configured in BIND basically the
same way as NXDOMAIN replies, but the zone file is not empty but contains DNS
resource records pointing to the server the hijacking should lead to. Name hijacking
can be used in principle to manipulate single DNS resource records.
Name Astrayment Technically name astrayment is a variation of Name Hijacking but
the recursive DNS server is returning an address which is deemed to be unused or
illegal. This will result in the client software trying unsuccessfully to connect and
return an error message like “Could not connect”. Configuration in BIND is exactly
the same as with name hijacking. Name Astrayment can be used in principle to
manipulate single DNS resource records.
Silence The single way of not returning incorrect data for a blocked domain name be-
sides returning REFUSED answers is not answer at all. Using BIND silence shares
the problem of tampering with all DNS resource record types, like sending refused
replies does. The Silence method of tampering will result in a “Host not found”
message to the user after a considerable delay. See figure 2 for a possible imple-
mentation of this technique with BIND. It should be explicitly stated that BIND was
not designed to be used this way so that this configuration can result in malfunctions
of the software.
Provoked Server Failures Provoked server failures are from the servers point of view
similar to silence. Instead of provoking a internal failure leading to a timeout, an
internal failure which is detected immediately is provoked and leads to a SERVER-
FAIL response to the client. See figure 2 for a possible implementation with BIND.
It should again be explicitly stated that BIND was not designed to be used this way,
so that this configuration can result in malfunctions of the software.
2.2.3 Problems of DNS-Tampering
Real-world implementations of DNS-tampering face serious problems. DNS was designed
to control data on a per zone basis. Domains are delegated from domains higher in the tree
of the distributed DNS database to the respective owners of the domains which manage
their domains in one or more zones. Therefore, neither DNS nor popular server software
for DNS are designed to allow modifications to single DNS resource records on their own,
but only to DNS resource records as part of a zone you are authorative for, meaning you
“own” the zone’s domain. This actually means a provider trying to implement DNS based
blocking can not configure it’s software to block just certain names. It must create zones on
it’s name servers for the names to block and put the fake data in there. It must also retrieve
all other data not to be blocked from the authorative, name servers and put it in there. It
finally must assure in some way that this data retrieved from the authorative nameservers
is in sync with their sources in some way.
An example will illustrate the problems: providers are ordered to block all Web pages
on the host names www.bad.example.com and bad.example.com. There is another host
named not-so.bad.example.com which is not to be blocked. There are also several dozen
hosts in the domain to.bad.example.com. Using the name hijacking technique providers
could create a zone named bad.example.com and insert fake DNS A resource records for
bad.example.com and www.bad.example.com in the zone file. Now they have to retrieve
MX and all other kinds of DNS resource records for those two entries from the authorative
name server and also add them to their zone file. Failing to copy this records from the
authorative name servers would result in failures for other queries than to DNS A resource
records. This would be especially harmful to email traffic and which was - contrary to
Web traffic - not to be blocked.
They also have to retrieve all resource records for not-so.bad.example.com from the au-
thorative name server and insert them in their zone file. They can get around putting the
data for all the names in the to.bad.example.com domain into their zone file using special
DNS NS resource records to point back to the authorative servers.
They have to ensure that the data they retrieve from the authorative name servers stays fresh
and changes made at the authorative name servers propagate in their zone file. Literature
suggests using intervals between 3 and 24 hours for checking the if data in the zone file
needs a refresh [AL99].
Even this complex setup can’t be implemented with all domains. To collect the data for
the zone file one must know the names in the original domain. There are two reliable
way of finding the all names in a zone. The first, a so called “zone transfer” can be
requested by a client from an authorative name server and will result in a complete copy
of all data in the zone. But nowadays it is considered good security practice to disallow
zone transfers from unknown parties [AL99]. An alternative is the technique of walking
DNSSEC resource records. But since DNSSEC is not widely deployed this technique is
very seldom applicable. This means often there is no way to get the list of hostnames in a
domain.
The only solution to this problems seems to develop software specially designed to do
DNS-tampering. The alternative would be accepting that email to the domain names con-
taining the content to be blocked can’t be sent and other hosts in the zone can’t be accessed
by the users of the blocking provider. Even worse, one can not tell which or how many
domain names are affected.
Other problems are specific to certain types of blocking. Refusing DNS lookup, NXDO-
MAIN replies, name astrayment, silence and provoked server failures all leave the users
with error messages not showing the reason why they where unable to access the blocked
Web pages. Also users not trying to access the blocked Web pages but other unintention-
ally blocked services will get inappropriate error messages. Name hijacking can lead to
serious privacy problems since the host where names are redirected to can record Web ac-
cesses and also email, chat and other services unintentionally blocked. Name astrayment
can lead to ghost packets wandering the Internet or provoke other unwanted effects in the
network, depending on which IP-address is used as an “illegal” address. Using the local-
host address 127.0.0.1, which always points to the individual computer the user is actually
operating, can result in various disturbing results, especially if the user is utilizing a HTTP
proxy. Name astrayment and silence can lead to long periods of waiting before the user
gets an error message. Applications may be unresponsive while waiting for DNS replies.
DNS-Tampering may also have side-effects on other parties. For example servers at the
provider may check incoming connections on consistent DNS data. This might result in
certain connections, e.g. email from the hosts with the blocked names to the blocking
providers servers being denied.
2.3 Filtering Proxies
The third technique widely discussed for blocking content are HTTP proxies deploying
filtering mechanisms. HTTP is the protocol used for transferring Web pages from the
Server to the user’s browser and HTTP proxies can be used to mediate this otherwise direct
HTTP communication. So called caching HTTP proxies are a relatively common Internet
infrastructure element, providing increased browsing speed and lowering an organizations
bandwidth usage. HTTP proxies also can be used in an application level firewall providing
Web access to clients who are not connected directly to the Internet.
A Web browser configured to use a HTTP proxy does not request pages directly from the
Web servers the user is trying to access. Instead the browser connects, as shown in figure 3
to the HTTP proxy and asks the proxy to deliver the content the user is requesting. The
HTTP proxy acquires the page on the user’s behalf from the Web server and delivers it
to the browser. Being directly embedded in the application layer of the communication
puts a HTTP proxy in a unique position for applying filtering or blocking mechanisms.
Generally Web browser software has to be modified to be able to use HTTP proxies, but
all major Web browsers today support the use of HTTP proxies.
2.3.1 Voluntary Proxy
Voluntary proxies used as caching HTTP proxy seem to be deployed at most providers
today. Nevertheless some providers use no HTTP Proxies [Hoe01]. Caching proxies are a
separate part of the providers’ network infrastructure and can be implemented by running
proxy software on a standard workstation or by a dedicated hardware caching engine.
Basically the use of these proxies is completely voluntary, but some providers use various
incentives like faster access or more attractive charging for traffic via proxy to convince
users to use the proxies. Preconfigured Internet access software usually is configured by
the provider to use the provider’s proxy servers. Auto configuration in Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer can be used to activate proxy usage without further user involvement.
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Figure 3: Working of HTTP-Proxies
2.3.2 Enforced Proxy
Enforced proxies are implemented exactly the same way as voluntary proxies but IP-
filtering is used to deny direct Web access to users. This means users have to configure
their browsers to use the provider’s proxy or wouldn’t be able to access the Web. To the
providers this means they have the combined workload of running a voluntary proxy and
IP-filtering plus considerable support costs from user inquiries.
2.3.3 Interception Proxy
Interception proxies - sometimes called transparent proxies - are a variation of enforced
proxies. Instead of forcing the users to configure their browsers to use the proxy like in the
enforced proxy model, an interception proxy architecture automatically forces every single
Web related data packet through the proxy. This is implemented transparently to the user
by instructing routers or other networking devices via the Web Cache Communication
Protocol (WCCP) or some other mechanism to redirect Web related packets away from
their destination to the proxy caches as shown in figure 4. Alternatively an in-line gateway
device with cache functionality can be deployed when restructuring the network in a way
that all traffic has to pass this device.
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Figure 4: Working of interception HTTP proxies
2.3.4 Potential of HTTP Proxies
HTTP proxies substantially change the characteristics of HTTP communication. HTTP
is using in principle a direct communication channel between two parties without any
mediation by third parties. Using a HTTP proxy changes this by changing the direct
communication to some form of mediated communication. The proxy acts as a person-in-
the-middle and is able to apply any modifications to the communication and do any logging
it desires. Interception proxies violate basic Internet design principles [BC01]. While his is
nothing bad per se, doing so requires careful analysis is of side-effects. [Hoe01] notes that
HTTP proxies increase surveillance powers and might not comply with labour protection
laws.
While [Sta02b] claims they can’t do, HTTP proxies are the only blocking measure which
can block very exact, alt least on a per URL basis, since they have full control over the
data stream. In principle HTTP proxies also allow only to filter out certain paragraphs on
a page.
An remarkable experiment performed in 2000 by Dragan Espenschied and Alvar C.H.
Freude helps to understand the potential of HTTP proxies [EF01]. Espenschied and
Freude, at that time students at the Merz Akademie, a university of applied arts, tested
the extent to which Web users are noticing manipulations done by proxies and how much
they are willing to endure manipulation.
Espenschied and Freude configured most workstations in their university to use a proxy
written by themselves. This special proxy was able to apply transformations to the data
stream passing through it. The transformations included:
• Exchanging words with a certain probability. This was used for mixing the names
of political parties, politicians and cities, inserting links to the owners of trademarks
mentioned on Web pages, exchanging “men” with “women”, “China” with “Iraq”,
“art” with “commerce” and so on.1
• Extending pages of popular freemail services with elements on every page pro-
moting the “Global Penpals Association” a fictions cooperation between Hotmail,
mail.com, Yahoo! and GMX. The Global Penpals Association area appearing on
every page suggested a person as personal pen pal, which the system claimed was
individually “selected based on your personal options and surfing habits”.
• After visiting popular search engines the user’s browser was displaying an additional
frame encouraging them to report anonymously found pages deemed objectionable
to an anti-hate organization via an form displayed at the top of each page.
• 2% of all accesses where redirected to advertisment pages at the fake domain “In-
terAd.gov”, which claimed to be a consortium of ICANN, Corenic, Internic, Net-
work Solutions and the US Department of Commerce. This side was reasoning that
advertisement was needed to finance the “Core-Servers” which were run by the US
government. Without watching the advertisement and filling a short survey surfers
were not able to reach the page they were originally trying to access.
• All students’ homepages on the University’s own servers appeared to have intrusive
pop-up windows advertising the university.
This impressive array of modifications to users’ Web reception went on mostly unnoticed
by the 250 students and the university staff for several months until it was uncovered by a
hardware failure in the workstation running the proxy software. Even after the experiment
was publicized, most students didn’t bother to change their browser’s settings back so they
could enjoy an unmanipulated view on the Web even through step-by-step instructions for
doing so were published.
The experiment by Espenschied and Freude shows the capabilities of proxy usage for con-
tent modification. While they have not experimented with blocking pages, their research
supports the assumption that substantial blocking can be done without the users noticing.
2.4 Circumvention of blocking measures
The legal literature discusses a wide array of circumvention techniques and often claims
that circumvention is generally easy to archive [Sch99] [Zim99] [Sta03]. We will look
at the different circumvention techniques mentioned and try to get to an estimate of the
practicability of the various approaches.
1See http://odem.org/static/insert coin/wordlist.txt (accessed 1.6.2003) for a complete list of exchanged
words.
Mirroring Mirroring describes a technique commonly used to reduce resource usage on
content providers’ hosts and increase availability of content. A mirror is a host re-
trieving the content from the original source and publishing it as a Website. The
retrieving and publishing is done regularly and often in an automated fashion. Mir-
roring can also be used to circumvent blocking by making content available from
other sources than the blocked one. Mirroring is only widely done with old style
static Websites which have little interactive elements. Modern, dynamic systems,
e.g. so called “Web forums” or database driven websites, can be mirrored only with
great effort. Mirroring can be used to circumvent IP-filtering, DNS-tampering and
filtering HTTP proxies. Circumvention by mirroring is not transparent to the user:
Users have to be informed of the mirrors’ addresses and start using them for ac-
cessing the blocked content. Mirroring as a circumvention measure is mentioned in
[Sch99], [Sie99], [Zim99] and [Eng03].
There is the assumption that users of blocked content exchange the new domain
names or addresses very quickly [Sch99] [Sie99]. This needs some further research
on why users which have communication channels not affected by blocking would
use them to communicate new domain name instead of transporting the blocked
content itself via this channels.
Additional Domain Names Content providers can try to evade blocking by using addi-
tional domain names pointing to the same content on the same host. While IP-
filtering is immune to this circumvention technique it is effective against DNS-
tampering and filtering HTTP proxies. Like mirroring this measure is not trans-
parent to the user. Users have to be informed of the additional domain names and
start using them for accessing the blocked content. In [Eng03] it is suggested that
this can be done automatically by browsers but does not explain how this would
work.
Additional domain names are seen relative often at blocked sites. For example
http://nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com/ is also accessible via the domain names auschwitz.biz,
bundesinnenministerium.biz, bundesinnenministerium.biz, bundesinnenministerium.us,
bundesjustizministerium.com, bundesjustizministerium.net, bundesjustizministerium.org,
bundesjustizministerium.us, bundesrepublikdeutschland.us,hitlerwasright.info, kan-
zleramt.us, nordrhein-westfalen.biz, nsdap.info, verfassungsschutz.biz, verfassungss-
chutz.us, zensurfrei.com and zuwanderungskommission.com.
Change of IP-Address Content providers can circumvent IP-filtering by changing the IP-
address of the host running the Web server software. This should be theoretically
transparent to the user, since the DNS would automatically allow the user’s Web
browser to start communicating with the new IP-address.
In practice implementing a way to change the IP-address several times a day needs
high technical sophistication. Literature often refers to the dutch provider xs4all
which in 1997 was changing IP-addresses on a hourly basis to circumvent being
blocked. To asses actions taken by xs4all one must consider that xs4all is one of the
oldest European providers with ties to the dutch Hack-Tic group and the German
Chaos Computer Club. There would be only few places where willingness to cir-
cumvent censorship and technical sophistication meet at such an high level as it did
at that time at xs4all. Still negative side-effects of the frequent address changes made
xs4all stop doing so after a few days. Low frequency changes of IP-address can ac-
complished without much technical sophistication. E.g. the host stormfront.org has
changed is IP-address 6 times in the last 8 months.2 If this happened to circumvent
blocking or for other reasons is unknown.
Changing of IP-address is discussed at [Sch99], [Sie99], [Sta02a], [Eng03] and
[Ros03b].
Change of Port Changing the port number used by the Web server software can be used
to circumvent layer 4 IP-filtering and possibly filtering HTTP proxies. This can be
done by simple configuration at the Web server software, but is not transparent to the
user. The user has to be informed of the modified port number and start using dif-
ferent URLs for accessing the blocked content. E.g. http://example.com/something/
might change to http://example.com:31337/something/. This circumvention method
is discussed at [Sch99], [Sie99] and [Eng03].
Web based Services Users can utilize translation services, privacy protection services
and other Web applications which process arbitrary content referenced by user spec-
ified URL [Sie99]. Technically the services are usually a specialized kind of proxy.
Using this services often requires the user to take several additional steps for every
blocked page he is trying to access, so browsing a page often is impossible. Some
of this services can’t handle dynamic Web content or sites requiring user authenti-
cation.
Search Engines and Archives In the Literature there are claims that search engines could
be used to access blocked content [Vas03]. It is not clear what authors are referring
to when mention this. Search engines usually only show you very small excerpts
of pages when displaying search results. This text fragments can’t be used to cir-
cumvent filters. A single search engine - google - has an additional archive feature
called “google cache” allowing the user to access a copy of the page google retrieved
and saved for it’s own searching purposes. This feature can be used to circumvent
blocking but the cached copy of the page will be updated only every few weeks and
cached copies are only saved for mostly static Web content.
The Internet Archive at http://www.archive.org/ basically offers the same function-
ality as the google cache, but also keeps older versions of a page instead of only
keeping the most recent copy. The use of this services is not transparent to the user
and requires possible special steps for each blocked page to be accessed. It should
be able to circumvent all types of blocking.
IP-Tunneling Sometimes it is claimed that any type of blocking can be simply circum-
vented by using the provider to connect to an other provider and route Internet traffic
through the second provider [Sie99] [Zim99]. While IP-in-IP tunneling is techni-
cally possible and can circumvent all types of blocking outlined above, there are no
providers offering IP-in-IP tunneling enabled accounts to end users. Even if users
2See http://uptime.netcraft.com/up/graph/?host=stormfront.org (accessed 1.6.2003).
would be able to find providers offering IP-in-IP tunneling on a commercial basis,
software for using IP-in-IP tunneling is simply not consumer-grade nowadays. So
“using a second provider” by IP-in-IP tunneling is no viable option to the average
Internet user for circumventing blocking by it’s provider.
Proxies Another method circumventing all types of blocking mentioned above is the use
of application-level proxies - be it HTTP-, Socks- or specialized proxies like peek-
a-booty or JAP or may be even alternative recursive DNS servers [Sie99] [Eng03].
These techniques require a third party cooperating in running the proxy software,
which sometimes might pose a problem. After a one time installation the usage of
such techniques usually is transparent to the user. Some of these like JAP seem in
relative wide deployment.
Trans-National Dial-In Some authors discuss using long-distance or trans-national call-
ing to access a non-blocking access provider in a different state or country [Zim99].
While doing so is possible, one must keep in mind that this is not possible for high-
speed Internet access and that the cost are prohibitive to most users.
Encryption Several authors claim that encryption could be used to circumvent blocking
[Sch99] [Eng03]. While encryption can be a powerful addition to some of the tech-
niques mentioned above there seems to be very limited benefit for circumvention
from using encryption alone. IP-filtering at layer 3 is completely unaffected while
layer 4 filtering could be circumvented with certain kinds of encryption. The cryp-
tographic DNSSEC functionality could be used to detect DNS-tampering but not to
circumvent it. HTTPS could be used to hide the exact URLs being accessed from
the proxy but can not be used to hide which host is accessed. All this cryptographic
techniques also face non-trivial implementation issues on the severer side. Encryp-
tion without the involvement of third parties generally can hide the content of the
communication but not which hosts are communication with each other, so usage
for circumventing blocking measures is very limited.
Direct Use of IP-Addresses Literature suggests that DNS-tampering can be circumvented
by using IP-addresses in URLs instead of domain names [Sie99], [Sta02b] [Eng03].
While substituting domain names with IP-addresses to circumvent DNS is gener-
ally possible, it usually can’t be used for accessing domains hosted by name based
virtual hosting.
There is a wide variety of possible circumvention techniques. Still it is inappropriate
to state that blocking can be easily circumvented. Most circumvention techniques are
technically complex or burdensome to the user or need the cooperation of a third party.
3 The Du¨sseldorf blocking orders
The actual incident driving the discussion about blocking of foreign Web content are mea-
sures taken by authorities in Germany. A short overview about the events so far will be
given to allow non German speaking readers to understand the situation.
3.1 Prelude
The district government of Du¨sseldorf is the government agency for regulating media in
North-Rhine-Westphalia (NRW), Germany’s biggest state with about 18 million citizens.
At the beginning of October 2001 the district government invited NRW’s providers for a
hearing about “illegal and harmful content on the Internet”. A few days later there was a
second hearing on possible technical implementations to block the domains front14.org,
rotten.com, nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com and stormfront.org.
At the end of November 2001 some providers started to implement DNS-tampering. Exact
details of this incident are only known in regard to the City Carrier ISIS. ISIS used DNS-
tampering to direct users trying to access Web content at the domains mentioned above
to an Web server running at ISIS. This server used a HTTP-redirect to send surfers to a
special page at the district government’s Web server for “reporting right wing extremism,
and other objectionable content / consumer protection”. After an public outcry about the
privacy implications of this, ISIS stopped the DNS-tampering. Doing so ISIS found it-
self accused of helping right wing extremism, so they started again with DNS-tampering.
This time they made all relevant DNS entries pointing to 127.0.0.1 which can result in
unexpected effects.
3.2 The Blocking order
In the beginning of February 2002 the district government issued a blocking order to 78
providers in NRW asking them to block two Web pages.
Following will be the parts of the blocking order which are relevant to the question what
exactly is meant to be blocked as translated by a professional translator:
06. February 2002: Supervision under the Media Services Treaty between the Ger-
man La¨nder [states] / Regulatory proceedings where provisions of the Media Services
Treaty have been violated / Re my letter of 5 October 2001 and the oral hearings of 13
November 2001 and 19 December 2001 /Blocking order
I hereby instruct you to block the access to the Internet pages [Seiten] http://www.stormfront.org
and http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com as part of the services you provide.
Additional note for universities and other institutions of higher education [Fachhochhochschulen]:
You are exempt from this obligation to block to the extent that you need to make these
sites available for the purpose of scholarship, research or teaching. If this is the case,
suitable technical measures must be employed to restrict the time and location of use.
Reasons: [. . . ]
Under section 18 (2) of the Media Services Treaty [MDStV] and section 1 (2) of the
Regulatory Authorities Act [OBG], if there is a violation of the provisions of the Me-
dia Services Treaty [MDStV], the regulatory authority that is responsible must take
the measures against the provider that are necessary to remove the violation. In partic-
ular, it may forbid providers to offer certain content and may order this content to be
blocked.
The Internet pages [Seiten] listed below contain material that is prohibited by section
8 (1) of the Media Services Treaty [MDStV] and therefore violates the Media Services
Treaty [MDStV]:
a) http://www.stormfront.org
The U.S. ISP stormfront.org hosts Internet pages [Seiten] that are exclusively right-
wing extremist, most of them in English. A commercial service is provided in the
form of various packages. stormfront.org offers storage, data transfer, email addresses
with their own domain names etc., all at customary market prices.
The main page [Hauptseite] makes it clear that stormfront.org has rightwing extremist
ideas. In a German language section [Angebot], for example, there is an explanation
of the term “liberated zones” [Befreite Zonen] and what is intended to be done with
those of a different opinion: “. . . we punish deviants and enemies . . . ”
On the main page, there are links to fifteen different categories, topics and services.
For example, there are a women’s page and a children’s page, pages on fundamental
questions of racist ideology, a text library, a press page, a page for upcoming events
and so on. As a whole, the site is addressed to the general public and aims to shape
and influence public opinion. The site as a whole is designed, like a newspaper, with
various editorial categories [redaktionell: editorially].
Because it has so many links, the site also functions as a distribution network for the
German rightwing extremist scene.
This site is impermissible for the following reasons:
1. it violates provisions of the German Criminal Code [StGB] (section 8 (1) no. 1
of the Media Services Treaty)
The pages http://stormfront.org/german/zonen.htm and the links http://www.thulenet.com/index1.php
and http://www.thule-net.com/strafbar/div.htm constitute the offence of stirring
up hatred against national, ethnic, racial or religious groups [Volksverhetzung]
contrary to section 130 (1) and (2) of the German Criminal Code [StGB] [. . . ]
The pages http://www.stormfront.org/gus.html and the link http://www.panzerfaust.com/flags/flags.htm
constitute the offence defined in section 86 of the German Criminal Code [StGB]
(Dissemination of means of propaganda of unconstitutional organizations). [. . . ]
2. it glorifies war (section 8 (1) no. 2 of the Media Services Treaty [MDStV]):
for example, on the web page [Webseite] http://www.stormfront.org/german/zentrale.htm,
but also throughout the whole site [Angebot].
3. in the alternative, in addition it is clearly suited to create serious moral danger
to children and young people (section 8 (1) no. 3 of the Media Services Treaty
[MDStV]):
The whole Website [Angebot] of stormfront.org serves to propagate National
Socialist ideology with the goal of creating National Socialist rule. [. . . ]
[. . . ]
b. http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com
This page makes National Socialist propaganda material available, and the victims of
the holocaust are cynically disparaged. [. . . ]
The multi-paged home page contains several pages, subdivided into categories, topics
and services. The site [Angebot] as a whole is designed editorially [redaktionell], like
a newspaper.
Because it has so many references [Verweise] and links, the site also functions as a
distribution network, inter alia for the German rightwing extremist scene.
This site is impermissible for the following reasons:
1. it violates provisions of the German Criminal Code (section 8 (1) no. 1 of the
Media Services Treaty [MDStV])
The home page itself and the direct references [Verweise] constitute the offence
of stirring up hatred against national, ethnic, racial or religious groups contrary
to section 130 (1) and (2) of the German Criminal Code [StGB] by inciting
hatred and destruction of Jews and other “enemies of the people”. [. . . ]
2. it glorifies war (section 8 (1) no. 2 of the Media Services Treaty [MDStV]) [. . . ]
3. in the alternative, in addition it is clearly suited to create serious moral danger
to children and young people (section 8 (1) no. 3 of the Media Services Treaty
[MDStV]):
The whole Website [Angebot] of nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com serves to propagate
National Socialist ideology with the goal of creating National Socialist rule.
[. . . ]
[. . . ]
On the basis of the technical research I have carried out and the hearing procedure, I
have come to the conclusion that in the present state of the art there are three possibil-
ities of blocking this material:
1. Excluding domains on the domain server (DNS)
If the access provider operates a DNS, this can be configured to relay enquiries
not to the correct server but to an invalid or to another predefined page [Seite].
2. Use of a proxy server
The URL, the precise allocation criterium of the individual web page [Web-
Seite] on the relevant server, can be blocked by the use of a proxy server. En-
quiries for the prohibited sites [Angebot] are filtered and access is denied, or
the enquiry is rerouted to a predefined page [Seite] in the browser and linked
[hingewiesen]:
3. Excluding IPs by blocking them at the router level
The router can be configured so that all the data traffic to a particular IP-address
is not forwarded.
In addition, further technical possibilities are being tested at present.
The three possibilities of blocking mentioned above have the effect, without making
technical alterations to a user’s computer, that when the above domain names, which
are the subject of this blocking order, are entered, the prohibited sites can no longer
be accessed. Apart from this, when notification was made that the sites were prohib-
ited, some providers blocked the sites, most of them using the DNS method, and this
showed that it is technically possible to block the sites.
The blocking is also reasonable.
It is necessary here to weigh the burden caused to a provider by blocking a site
against the legal interest threatened or injured by the dissemination of the contents
(see Ros¨nagel, Recht der Multimediadienste, Part 4, section l8, marginal no. 41).
As set out above, in my opinion the exclusion of domain in domain name servers
(DNS) is sufficient and permissible in the present state of the art. This type of blocking
can be carried out simply by configuring the DNS and incurs very low personnel costs
on only one occasion. There are no material costs.
[. . . ]
3.3 Follow-Up
Some Providers were appealing for the blocking orders but the district government re-
jected the appeals in July 2002. In the notification of the rejection the district government
hinted that it preferred “DNS-Blocking” over other blocking techniques and stated that
“this method can be implemented through easy configuration of the server and would only
require a one time small amount of work and no materials.”
Several providers filed complaints at local courts. This would have resulted in the blocking
orders being frozen until the courts came to a decision. In September 2002 the district
government used urgency orders (“Anordnung der sofortigen Vollziehung”) to change that.
To protect the public interest, it argued, the blocking orders should be in place until the
courts decide. Several providers filed complaints again against this urgency order. Five
local courts approved the urgency order and one rejected it. The court of appeal for the
urgency orders then approved the urgency orders. Up to now no court has decided about
the blocking orders.
After some hinting by the court of appeals the district government retracted not only the
urgency order, but also the blocking order itself against the provider Telefnica. The reason-
ing was that Telefnica is not an access provider but an backbone provider and configuration
of blocking in their carrier-class network would be to burdensome [Sch03].
3.4 What does the blocking order actually order?
It is very hard to understand what the blocking order actually wants to accomplish. There
is at least certainty to some degree in the fact that the blocking order only talks about the
Web. The whole blocking order uses exclusively vocabulary related to the Web and URLs
referencing traditional web content reachable via the the HTTP protocol.
3.4.1 What is to be blocked?
Understanding which Web content is ordered to be blocked is much more difficult. While
the blocking order’s wording is clear that two Web pages referenced by URL - “which is
the precise allocation criterium of the individual web page[s]”,3 - namely http://www.stormfront.org/
and http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com/ should be blocked, there is much indication that
they actually want more than two Web pages to be blocked. In the reasoning the blocking
orders first refer to the two “Internet pages”, but later they speak about stormfront.org’s
“main page”, which might be better translated by “home page” and use two other pages
on that server and two pages only linked, hosted somewhere else, as reasoning for the
blocking order. They also speak of the US “ISP” stormfront.org hosting right-wing con-
tent. The blocking order twice refers to stormfront.org’s “Angebote” which was translated
with “sites” but also can mean “offerings”. Does the blocking order actually want ev-
erything hosted at the ISP stormfront.org to be blocked? Or are they aware of the fact
that http://www.stormfront.org/ is similar to http://stormfront.org/ and would see both to
be blocked? The blocking order asks for http://www.stormfront.org/ to be blocked but
uses content referenced via the URL http://stormfront.org/german/zonen.htm which uses
an different domain name.
For the “page” http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com the situation is similar: It is described
as a “multi-paged home page” but also reasoned that “the homepage itself [contains many
direct references]”, then mentioned is a page with comments by Osama bin Laden which is
located at http://www.nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com/binladen.htm and than again talk about the
“whole offering” of nazi-lauck.nsdapao.com, but call nazi-lauck-nsdapao.com - contrary
to stormfront.org - not an ISP, although both sell Web space, email accounts, etc.
The whole wording of the blocking orders is extremely confusing. They refer to “Internet
pages” (Internet Seiten), “offerings” (Angebote), “main page” or “home page” (Haupt-
seite), “multi-paged home page” (mehrseitige Homepage), “Pages” (Seiten), “links” (Links),
“Web pages” (Webseiten), “whole Website” or “whole offering” (Gesamtangebot), “ref-
erences and links” (Verweise und Links) and “direct references” (unmittelbare Verweise)
without explaining what these different terms should mean.
3.4.2 How should blocking be accomplished?
The problems understanding the blocking orders continue when trying to understand how
blocking should be accomplished. In the first option for blocking there is very imprecise
wording. DNS is - contrary to the claims in the blocking orders - not an acronym for
“domain server” and not even for “domain name server”. DNS stands for “domain name
system” and describes a global, distributed database [AL99]. So no single provider “op-
erates a DNS” as assumed by the blocking orders. While it can be safely assumed the
blocking orders meant a recursive DNS server when they wrote DNS, the actual wording
leaves the reader with a feeling that there are serious misconceptions about the working
of DNS. This feeling manifests when reading the next sentence asking for queries to be
“relayed to an invalid or an predefined page”. There is no concept of pages in DNS, but
only names and DNS resource records, so this simply can’t be done. The only thing a
recursive DNS resolver can return in this context are IP-addresses. However there is no
such thing as an invalid IP-address or the IP-address of a predefined page. So the only
action a recursive DNS server can take to vaguely resemble what this part of the blocking
3Blocking order, emphasis by author.
order might want to mandate, is returning the IP-address of a Web server which is sending
a “predefined page” or redirecting the user to a “predefined page”.
Another question arises from the fact that the whole section explaining what should be
blocked never explicitly mentions domains - so which domains actually should be blocked?
The wording of the whole passage and the fact that the most obvious way of DNS-
tampering - refusing the query - is not allowed as a blocking measure and that the problem
posed by different kinds of DNS resource records and handling of domain names in the
same zone as the ones to be blocked are not mentioned at all, leaves many questions.
In the second blocking option the wording is again imprecise but it is possible to give
somewhat consistent meaning to it. Still the blocking orders do not mention what can be
considered “use of a proxy”. Are the blocking orders fulfilled if a provider deploys filter-
ing in a voluntary proxy as considered by [Ros03b] or do only enforced and interception
proxies qualify? Also, which “individual web pages” or which URLs should be blocked?
The third blocking option mandates layer 3 IP-filtering. What this section doesn’t state is
which IP-addresses are to be filtered or at least how and how often to determine which IP-
addresses to be filtered by resolving the domain names to be blocked. It was already shown
that it is hard to find out which Web content the blocking order is ordering to be filtered
- finding which IP-addresses belong to the web content is not that hard but the mapping
from a domain name to an IP-address might change anytime, so it has to be monitored
and updated [Ros03b]. As already mentioned the IP-address for stormfront.org changed 6
times in the last eight months.
The blocking orders are explicitly ordering layer 3 filtering, while layer 4 filtering is the
obvious way of blocking access to Web content and has much fewer side-effects than
layer 3 filtering. There is no reasoning in the blocking orders why layer 3 filtering is
mandated.
Finally the blocking orders also state that at least DNS-tampering “can be carried out
simply by configuring the DNS and incurs very low personnel costs on only one occa-
sion”. Supporters of the blocking orders like [Man02], but also authors opposing them like
[Ros03a] even claim not only DNS-tampering but also filtering proxies and IP-filtering use
only minimal resources at the provider. This claims can’t be supported by facts. As shown
above in many cases blocking via DNS-tampering can’t be configured at all with popular
software like BIND - unless you are accepting that you also harm a unknown number of
domain names in the same domain. Blocking by tampering with IP-addresses in DNS A
resource records also is extremely difficult to achieve without also affecting other DNS
resource records. To do so constant maintenance and updating is needed. Also sound
engineering practices - which are crucial to run critical infrastructure at carrier class level
- dictate that no configuration change to a vital production system is trivial. Especially
making software explicit behaviour it was not designed to do requires rigid change control
including extensive testing and monitoring. In the legal literature only [Zim99] considers
this fact, but [Sch03] suggests, that the courts also understand this - at least in some cases.
What is completely missing from the blocking orders is a description of what actual con-
tent is to be blocked. Web content is very volatile: Web servers get reorganized, domains
get new owners. This was prominently demonstrated in the context of the blocking orders
by the Website at www.front14.org: at fall 2001 this domain contained a right wing ex-
tremist portal but by spring 2002 there was a Web catalog at the same Address with no
obvious political agenda. This underlines the need for identifying pages to be blocked not
only by their location via an URL but also by their actual content. A machine readable
description, e.g. in form of a cryptographic fingerprint could be easily generated in an au-
tomatic fashion and also could be also used for automatically determining if the content to
be blocked still is residing at the URL which was blocked.
It is also noteworthy that the blocking orders set no emphasis on the users at all. The user
experience of the blocking measures seems to be completely out of concern. One would
have expected that the orders were crafted in a way that users trying to access blocked
pages do not end up with obscure errors but get a clear message that the access to the
content they have tried to reach was prohibited by the district government. While a demo-
cratic society actually has the right to suppress certain speech in certain circumstances, the
fact that something has been suppressed must be clearly stated, instead of being hidden in
obscure error messages. Suppressing unwanted speech clandestine seems not worthy of a
democracy.
4 Current DNS-Situation
It seems that tampering with DNS is the preferred way by providers and the district gov-
ernment of hampering access to certain Websites. While researching the blocking orders
I was only able to verify IP-filtering at one Institution with additional rumors about IP-
filtering at a second institution.
As shown above there are several implementation choices for DNS-tampering which have
very different implications for affecting other services, privacy of users and user experi-
ence. To assess the current state of DNS-tampering empirical research was conducted by
doing a DNS survey on recursive DNS servers at providers in NRW.
4.1 Survey Methodology
The goal of the survey was to get an overview of the current implementations of DNS-
tampering. Most accurate results would have been obtained by signing up with all providers
in NRW, accessing the Internet via their dial-in services and then querying the providers
recursive DNS servers as they where set via the dial-in process, for the domains to be
blocked. This method faces several serious drawbacks: Not only the costs and work-
load to carry through sign-up process with dozens of providers but also the fact that some
providers in the cable and xDSL sector are not accessible via dial-up and others like univer-
sities make their services available only to closed groups of subscribers. Another problem
is the fact that there is no authoritative list of access providers in NRW available. Even a
list of providers which received the blocking orders could not be obtained.
To overcome this a sample of name servers at providers in NRW was generated semi-
automatically and queried over the Internet. First a list of domain names of providers
in NRW was obtained by querying the provider section of http://web.de/, a big German
Internet catalog, for providers with ZIPs mapping to NRW. In addition a list of NRW’s
Universities’ and polytechnic Universities’ domain names was obtained from the Web.
These domains where queried for canonical host names often used by recursive servers.
In addition zone transfers for the domains where tried, to find subdomains for which the
procedure was repeated in a recursive fashion. Additional recursive DNS servers where
found by querying the DNS NS resource records for the domains obtained by the steps
above. For some high-profile providers where no recursive DNS servers were found by
the above procedure a Web search on provider name and “DNS Server” was carried out
and results added to the list. Finally the list was purged of name servers obviously not
belonging to providers in NRW. Some providers from different German states where kept
in a separate list as a control group.
Using this list of recursive DNS servers for a survey has certain disadvantages. First there
is no guarantee that the users of a provider use the same recursive DNS servers than the
ones which were accessed by the survey. Also the servers may refuse queries from the
Internet or deliver different data to external users than to internal ones. Keeping these con-
straints in mind, the survey methodology still seems to be an appropriate tool for collecting
an overview of DNS-tampering in the wild. But one must carefully keep in mind that the
data was not gathered in a way guaranteeing it to be representative. Specifically drawing
conclusions on the percentage of providers deploying blocking is nearly impossible.
Between the 10. and 13. of May 2003 the recursive DNS servers on the list were queried
for records of type A, ANY, MX, NS and SOA for several names within the nazi-lauck-
nsdapao.org, stormfront.org front14.org and rotten.com domains. Data for some other
domains was requested as a control group.
DNS-replies varied far more than expected. This made an automatic categorisation dif-
ficult. Only DNS MX and A resource records for stormfront.org, www.stormfront.org,
kids.stormfront.org, rotten.com and md.hudora.de where analyzed. Automatic methods
were used for screening the resulting data and singling out replies which indicated tamper-
ing. Reference data was obtained form a recursive DNS server known to be untampered.
Replies from other recursive DNS servers were compared to this data. Replies containing
mostly the same header fields as the reference data were considered untampered.4 Com-
paring the answer section of the replies turned out that many recursive DNS servers are
modifying the preference parameter of DNS MX resource records returned. Also the TTLs
of replies varied. Replies only varying in the TTL or MX-preference where considered un-
tampered. Replies with a REFUSED status where saved for further analysis in the future,
replies with a NXDOMAIN status where logged as being tampered and replies with an
NOERROR status, but failing the comparison against the reference data where dumped in
a format resembling output of the UNIX tool “dig” for further analysis by human inspec-
tion. Then replies per recursive DNS server where aggregated to one group per provider
by querying WHOIS records for the recursive DNS server’s IP-address. Where this data
4The following header fields had to have the same values to consider two headers similar: ancount, opcode,
qr, rcode, rd, status, tc. Oddly there where a substantial number of replies which had the aa flag set. Reasons for
this need further investigation.
seemed inappropriate, additional research on the Web was carried out.
4.2 Findings
Datasets returned by recursive DNS servers of different providers varied greatly and were
hard to group together in an intuitive fashion. We will first look at results grouped by what
they actually block and in which way they do this. Following that, providers with strong
distinctions will be shown. Finally data will be summarized. All results will refer only to
domain names in the stormfront.org domain unless there are notable exceptions with other
domain names.
4.2.1 Results and References / Examples
hijacking / NXDOMAIN combination Some providers manipulate their recursive DNS
server in a way that queries for www.stormfront.org result in some kind of answer
which should accomplish blocking. Results to all other queries in the domain storm-
front.org result in NXDOMAIN replies stating that the queried name does not exist.
Interestingly queries for requests to the stormfront.org domain name itself result not
in an NXDOMAIN reply but in an empty answer. Both types of reply result in do-
main names as kids.stormfront.org and stormfront.org and also mail service being
unavailable. Implementation details vary widely:
• Kamp Netzwerkdienste GmbH returns the address of an machine on their net-
work for www.stormfront.org. The Web server on the Kamp machine redirects
to a non existent page on a server of the district government.5 This results in a
“file not found” error to the user.
• The Ruhr Universita¨t Bochum and Evangelische Fachhochschule RWL return a
so called “CNAME” for DNS A resource record queries to www.stormfront.org
which points to the address of an machine at the Ruhr Universita¨t Bochum.
This machine redirects requests for http://www.stormfront.org/ to a page6 claim-
ing in German language: “The content of the requested page is deemed illegal
by German law”.
• tro:net GmbH returns the IP-address of one of tro.net’s machines to queries
for DNS A resource records for the domain name www.stormfront.org. The
user accessing http://www.stormfront.org/ is shown a page claiming in German
language about www.stormfront.org that “this domain is already registered, a
Website is being built”.
• tops.net GmbH & Co. KG returns for IP-address queries to www.stormfront.org
a DNS CNAME resource record pointing to sperrungsverfuegung.tops.net. For
stormfront.org the IP-address of sperrungsverfuegung.tops.net, is returned di-
rectly. This machine returns a text with a very complete explanation of the
5Namely http://www.bezreg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/cat/SilverStream/Pages/presseframe?BeitragsID=7008.
6Namely http://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/www-rz/zollehcc/ rz/unzulaessig.htm.
blocking situation. It also tries to store a so called cookie on the user’s Browser
enabling tops.net to re-identify it should the user access other Web pages at
tops.net.
NXDOMAIN Global Village GmbH, INCAS AG and NetCologne GmbH all reply for any
query in the stormfront.org zone that the requested data does not exist. For requests
to the stormfront.org domain name themselves they return an empty reply. Both
result in “Host not found” error messages for every Web request or email attempt.
www only hijacking Some Providers leave the domain stormfront.org itself untouched
and tamper with the www.stormfront.org domain name only. This results in Web
access to http://stormfront.org/ and email to any@stormfront.org being unaffected,
while DNS MX resource records for mailing to any@www.stormfront.org are dam-
aged in a way that email to these addresses would probably bounce with an error
message.
• Bogs Marketing & IT GmbH, LB MikroComputerTechnik, pixelhouse media
services and UUnet return to users querying for www.stormfront.org the IP-
address of a machine at UUnet which deploys a Web server redirecting users
trying to access http://www.stormfront.org to a page at eco.de,7 informing
about the situation.
• Westend GmbH is returning the IP-address of one of their own machines run-
ning a Web server redirecting the user to the eco page informing about blocking
mentioned above.
• Xenologics Networks & Communications GmbH returns the IP-address of a
machine on their own network for queries to DNS A resource records, redi-
recting again to eco. It seems this company has tried to avoid blocking email:
they did so by besides inserting DNS A resource records pointing to their own
machine also adding DNS MX resource records in the www.stormfront.org
zone file. But the data returned for MX queries by Xenologics is not consistent
with the data returned by the authorative nameservers for stormfront.org. It can
be safely assumed that Xenologics put once correct DNS MX resource record
data in the zone file but failed to update it regularly. So the actual configuration
still results in problems sending email to addresses at www.stormfront.org.
• ST-oneline InterNet Service Provider GmbH, Versatel Deutschland GmbH und
Co KG, Pironet NDH AG and wel.de Gesellschaft fu¨r Informationsdienste re-
turn the address of a machine at Pironet NDH AG, redirecting to a page by eco8
which is advertising a completely unrelated product. Some of ST-oneline’s,
Versatel’s and wel.de’s recursive DNS servers return untampered data.
• Ginko / QSC AG do not redirect users which try to access http://www.stormfront.org/
to a special page. Instead they return an empty zone for the name www.stormfront.org
resulting in “Host not found” error messages to the user.
7Namely http://www.eco.de/servlet/PB/menu/1188401 l1/index.html.
8Namely http://www.eco.de/greenspot .
• regioconnect GmbH deploys name astrayment by answering queries for the
address of www.stormfront.org with IP-address of 127.0.0.1. This results in
the wide array of possible disturbing results outlined above.
should be accessible blocked obscure error
blocked error rate
stormfront.org yes 12 4 11 44%
www.stormfront.org yes 0 12 15 0%
kids.stormfront.org no 12 0 15 56%
rotten.com no 24 3 0 11%
Table 1: Effectiveness of blocking Web pages via DNS-tampering
Some providers do manipulations which do not fit in the categories above.
• Universita¨t Essen is doing name astrayment by returning the IP-address 1.1.1.1.
for address queries to www.stormfront.org and stormfront.org. This IP-address is
not controlled by the University of Essen, but IANA. At the moment IANA has
announced no routes for this IP-address to the Internet. This usually results in data
designated to 1.1.1.1 wandering around the Internet for some time until finally the
data is discarded and the sender is informed that 1.1.1.1 is not reachable. This will
result in “Could not connect” error messages to the user after some time.
It seems the University of Essen tried to use a “invalid” IP-address. But there are
no invalid IP-addresses. The university of Essen has no right to direct traffic to IP-
addresses not allocated to it if the “owner” of the IP-address does not consent. I
strongly doubt that the IANA has consented in using 1.1.1.1 to do DNS-tampering.
At least one name server inside the University does return original, untampered data.
• ISIS Multimedia Net GmbH is doing name astrayment by returning the IP-address
127.0.0.1 to all DNS A resource record queries within the stormfront.org domain.
Queries to all other kinds of DNS resource records result in NXDOMAIN or empty
replies. This means as shown above that users trying to access Web pages on any
domain name in the stormfront.org domain see their own computers’ content or their
providers Web pages or get an error message.
• Fachochschule Mu¨nster a polytechnic University and Citykom Mu¨nster GmbH Telekom-
munikationsservice, both located in the city of Mu¨nster, do some very active manip-
ulations of DNS data. For www.stormfront.org FH-Mu¨nster returns the Address
127.0.0.1 which is the address of the users own computer. See above for results
of this manipulations. Citykom returns the address of a server at Citycom which
sends invalid data to the requesting browser breaking the HTTP specification and
leaving the user with an error message. It can be assumed that Citykom wanted to
redirect users to a page at the district government’s server9 but made an error when
9Namely http://www.bezreg-duesseldorf.nrw.de/cat/SilverStream/Pages/presseframe?BeitragsID=7008.
configuring this behaviour. If queried for any other DNS A resource records in the
stormfront.org zone, both providers reply with NXDOMAIN or empty answers.
The remarkable modification is that of DNS MX resource records, which direct
where email is sent to: both organization’s recursive DNS servers explicitly state
when queried for DNS MX resource records that email to stormfront.org should be
delivered to machines in their own organization. Citycom is also hijacking mail to
www.stormfront.org in the same manner.
• BergNet Onlinedienst GmbH, Oberberg Online Informationssysteme GmbH and Vi-
sion Consulting Deutschland OHG which seem to share some infrastructure, all
return to DNS A resource record queries on www.stormfront.org and stormfront.org
the IP-address of a machine at Vision Consulting which is presenting users a German
language page titled “Routing denied: The page you wish for will not be shown.”
followed by some paraphrased German laws about illegal Internet content. All other
queries in the domain stormfront.org result in NXDOMAIN or empty replies.
Also requests to http://www.rotten.com/, http://rotten.com/, http://www.front14.org/
and http://front14.org/ get redirected to the page mentioned above. All other re-
quests in the domains rotten.com and front14.org result in NXDOMAIN or empty
replies. One of Vision Consulting’s nameservers returns untampered DNS data.
should be unharmed broken error
blocked rate
postmaster@stormfront.org no 11 16 59%
postmaster@www.stormfront.org no 0 27 100%
postmaster@kids.stormfront.org no 12 16 59%
postmaster@rotten.com no 24 3 11%
Table 2: Side-effects on email of blocking Web pages via DNS-tampering
4.2.2 Summary
• Many Providers seem to assume that http://stormfront.org/ is not to be blocked. As
shown in table 1 of 27 providers 12 didn’t block it at all and 11 possibly blocked it
only by accident. This is an error rate of at least 44%.
• Keeping email usable seems to be no issue to most providers. As shown in table 2
all providers block at least some email. A single provider has tried to reduce email
blocking by not tampering with DNS MX resource records, but failed in this effort.
All other seemingly didn’t even try to keep email from being affected.
• Privacy of users trying to access the blocked pages seems to be no issue to most
providers. One provider is even using - possibly by accident - cookies, two providers
reroute email to their own systems, 10 providers return DNS A resource records at
machines located at other providers, 12 providers allow third parties to monitor redi-
rects leading to them, where in two cases the third party is the district government
itself.
• Informing users of what actually is happening seems of no priority. Web accesses
to blocked content results at 11 providers always in confusing errors and at all other
providers at least in some cases in confusing errors.
• Configuration of DNS-tampering seems to be difficult. At least 30% of the providers
have created major misconfigurations besides being overrestrictive or underprotec-
tive.
• Sites not directly mentioned in the blocking order and run by different persons than
the sites which were mandated to be blocked where substantially hit by erroneous
blocking. http://kids.stormfront.org/ is blocked by 58% of the surveyed providers.
http://www.rotten.com/, which the district government in 2001 briefly considered to
be blocked, is blocked by 11% of the providers.
• Compliance with the blocking orders seems to be next to impossible. As shown in
table 3, even when stretching the legal principles to the maximum and interpreting
the blocking orders in the broadest possible way, only 55% of the providers comply
with them. Interpreting the blocking orders more reasonable in a way that they try
to protect non-Web communication from being blocked, we see no single provider
complying. With this interpretation 45% underprotective and overrestrictive at the
same time while the remaining 55% are “only” overrestrictive.
underprotective complying overrestrictive correct
1 0 0 27 0%
2 12 0 27 0%
3 12 0 27 0%
4 0 12 15 45%
5 12 0 15 0%
6 12 15 0 55 %
1. block Web access on www.stomfront.org and leave other services untouched where possible
2. dito but also block stormfront.org
3. dito but block Web access to any name in the domain stormfront.org
4. block all communication to www.stomfront.org
5. block all communication to stormfront.org and www.stomfront.org
6. block all communication to any name in the domain stormfront.org
Table 3: Possible interpretations of the blocking order and the state of provider compliance
5 Conclusion
While it should certainly not be argued that government mandated blocking of foreign Web
content is mainly a technical problem, not looking at the technical aspects misses important
factors. It was shown that blocking from a technical point of view has considerable trade-
offs. DNS-tampering theoretically can’t be done without hurting an unknown amount of
other content and services. Even if this is accepted, configuring DNS-tampering with
minimal side-effects is very difficult with DNS software in wide use today. Forcing users
to use HTTP proxies opens their Web experience to a wide array of manipulation and
logging which has to be carefully considered. Many circumvention techniques are today
only a theoretical possibility or will be used only by a small fraction of Internet users.
The blocking orders themselves are technically imprecise to a degree that they are nearly
incomprehensible. This can be proofed by the fact that in any possible interpretation nearly
half of the surveyed providers do not comply with the blocking orders. The blocking orders
also fail to discuss while less intrusive measures like layer 4 IP-filtering are not preferred
over layer 3 IP-filtering.
Surveying the providers implementing DNS-tampering indicates that many are underpro-
tective and still more are overrestrictive. Being underprotective and overrestrictive seems
to be a common pattern in suppressing Web content [Hun00] [NW99].
Further research on blocking is needed. Foremost methods for estimating the side-effects
of blocking need to be developed since this estimates are crucial for the government mak-
ing informed decisions about blocking. In addition a common language for precisely
defining the content to be blocked seems to be badly needs. Also the actual effects of
the blocking orders should be monitored - not only from a technical point of view but also
from a criminological perspective.
References
[AL99] Paul Albitz and Cricket Liu. DNS and BIND. O’Reilly & Associates, Inc., 3 edition,
1999.
[APN00] APNIC. Discussion Paper: Use of HTTP/1.1 and virtual web sites, 2000.
[BC01] Marjory S. Blumenthal and David D. Clark. Rethinking the design of the Internet: the
end-to-end arguments vs. the brave new world. ACM Transactions on Internet Technol-
ogy (TOIT), 1(1):70–109, 2001.
[Ede03] Benjamin Edelman. Web Sites Sharing IP Addresses: Prevalence and Significance.
Research report, 2003.
[EF01] Dragan Espenschied and Alvar C.H. Freude. insert coin - Verborgene Mechanismen
und Machtstrukturen im freisten Medium von allen. Master’s thesis, Merz Akademie,
2001.
[Eng03] Christoph Engel. Die Interrnet-Service-Provider als Geiseln deutscher Ordnungs-
beho¨rden. MMR Beilage 4, pages 1–34, 2003.
[FGM+99] R. Fielding, J. Gettys, J. Mogul, H. Frystyk, L. Masinter, P. Leach, and T. Berners-Lee.
RfC 2616: Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP/1.1, 1999.
[Hoe01] Thomas Hoeren. Stellungnahme zur geplanten Sperrungsverfu¨gung der Bezirk-
sregierung Du¨sseldorf, November 2001.
[Hun00] Christopher D. Hunter. Internet filter effectiveness (student paper panel): testing over
and underinclusive blocking decisions of four popular filters. In Proceedings of the tenth
conference on Computers, freedom and privacy, pages 287–294. ACM Press, 2000.
[Man02] Peter Mankowski. Die Du¨sseldorfer Sperrungsverfu¨gung - alles andere als rheinischer
Karneval. MMR, pages 277–278, 2002.
[Moc87] P. Mockapetris. RfC 1035: Domain Names - Implementation and Specification, 1987.
[NW99] Peter G. Neumann and Lauren Weinstein. Inside risks: risks of content filtering. Com-
munications of the ACM, 42(11):152, 1999.
[Pro97] Nils Provos. Das Internet - Eine kurze Abhandlung u¨ber Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und
Zukunft., 1997.
[Ros03a] Timo Rosenkranz. Neuere Entwicklungen in der Sperrungsproblematik, 2003.
[Ros03b] Timo Rosenkranz. Sperrungsverfu¨gungen gegen Access-Provider. JurPC, pages Web–
Dok. 16/2003, 2003.
[Sch99] Gerhard Schneider. Die Wirksamkkeit der Sperrung von Internet-Zugriffen. MMR,
pages 571–577, 1999.
[Sch03] Thorsten Schreier. Du¨sseldorfer Sperrungsverfu¨gung: Warum ein Provider erfolgreich
war. MMR, pages 297–298, 2003.
[Sie99] Ulrich Sieber. Verantwortlichkeit im Internet. Beck, Mu¨nchen, 1999.
[Sta02a] Thomas Stader. Sperrungsverfu¨gungen gegen Access Provider. MMR, pages 343–347,
2002.
[Sta02b] Thomas Stadler. Der Widerspruchsbescheid zur Du¨sseldorfer Sperrungsverfu¨gung,
2002.
[Sta03] Thomas Stadler. Anmerkung zu VG Du¨sseldorf 15 L 4148/20. MMR, pages 208–211,
2003.
[Vas03] Irini E. Vassilaki. Urteilsanmerkung zu OLG Mu¨nster 8 B 2567/02. CR, pages 367–368,
2003.
[Zim99] Andreas Zimmermann. Polizeiliche Gefahrenabwehr und das Internet. NJW, pages
3145–3152, 1999.
